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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE ROUTINE TORTURE PRACTICES OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN
GOVERNMENT AS "COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY" WITHIN THE FOREIGN
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIEs ACT OF 1976 IN THE WAKE OF SAUDIARABIA
v. NELSON, 113 S. CT. 1471 (1993).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1983, Scott Nelson,' while residing within the United States, answered
a printed advertisement recruiting employees for the King Faisal Specialist
Hospital in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.' After being interviewed in Saudi Arabia
' Nelson, age 38, and his wife, Vivian Nelson, are both American citizens. Nelson is a
former Davie, Florida electrical engineer who presently lives in Raleigh, North Carolina. See
generally Timothy M. Phelps, Can An American Sue Saudis? Supreme Court To Weigh
Appeal, NEWSDAY, Nov. 29, 1992, at 7 (for a detailed account of Nelson's allegations and
background). See also Thomas W. Lippman, Workers' Tales of Torture Strain U.S.-Saudi
Ties; Bush Administration Sides With Mideast Ally Against Citizen In Supreme Court Case,
WASH. POST, May 24, 1992, at A8.
2 Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471
(1993). The Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), acting for the nation of Saudi Arabia,
announced an opening in the King Faisal Specialist Hospital's engineering/utilities
maintenance depirtment for a "monitoring systems engineer." The announcement appeared
in the September 8, 1983 issue of Engineering News-Record (published by McGraw-Hill
Publications Co.). Brief for Respondent at 4 & n.2, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471
(1993) (No. 91-522). The Saudi Arabian-HCA contract created an agency relationship
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and HCA. HCA was empowered to:
recruit and employ administrative, nursing, technical, maintenance, and
all other personnel with full authority to initially set and subsequently
adjust their salaries and other remuneration, to supervise such employees,
and in its sole judgment, to terminate the employment of any such
personnel ... [, however,] all employment contracts [were] between
[Saudi Arabia] and the employee, but [the contracts had to] be executed
for [Saudi Arabia] by HCA as agent .... All expatriate personnel
recruited must [have been] acceptable to [Saudi Arabia] which acceptabil-
ity [would have been] evidenced by issuance of an entrance visa.
Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1533.
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by two hospital officials,3 Nelson signed an employment contract in the
United States to be a monitoring systems engineer at the Hospital in
Riyadh.4 Nelson alleges that on March 20, 1984, while in the course of his
duties at the Hospital,5 he discovered safety hazards which he reported to
Hospital officials as well as to an investigative commission of the Saudi
Government.6 Subsequently, Nelson was summoned to the Hospital's
security office, where he was arrested and moved to a jail cell.7 He was
thereafter shackled, tortured, and beaten by agents of the Saudi Government s
Id. at 1530.
4 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474-75. The signing of the contract within the United States
indicates that the Saudi Arabian government purposely availed itself of American law taking
advantage of United States contract law to bind Scott Nelson to his employment agreement.
Consequently, the Saudi Government should have reasonably expected to be haled into the
American courts. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) ("fair
warning requirement satisfied if defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents
of forum...").
' As a "monitoring system engineer," Nelson was responsible for the development and
expansion, of electronic monitoring and control systems capabilities, for recommending
modifications of existing equipment, and for the purchase and installation of new equipment.
Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530. See Brief for Appellant at 5 (No. 91-522) (for a more complete
description of Nelson's duties).
6 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475. Over a period of several months, Nelson repeatedly advised
Hospital officials of the safety defects in the Hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide lines that
posed fire hazards and otherwise endangered patients' lives, but Hospital officials instructed
Nelson to ignore the problems. Id.
" Id. In addition, Nelson was kept in solitary confinement for four days without food.
He was then transferred to an overcrowded cell area infested with rats, where he had to fight
with other prisoners for food, and from which he was taken only once a week for fresh air
and exercise. Brief for Appellant at 7 & n.7 (No. 91-522).
8 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475. In one episode, Nelson was forced to do deep knee bends
with a metal rod strapped behind his knees until his knees cracked. Tony Mauro, Case
Focuses on Rights of U.S. Workers Overseas, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 30, 1992, at 8A (noting
that summary arrest and detention of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia is commonplace). In
another episode, two men held Nelson's feet while another man pulled his shoes off and beat
them with bamboo canes approximately 1/4 inch in diameter. Nelson is now permanently
disabled. He has undergone several operations on his knees, which had to be totally
reconstructed, and also several operations on his back. Problems Confronting U.S.
Businesspersons in Saudi Arabia; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle
East of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. at 22 [hereinafter
Problems Confronting Businesspersons) (statement of Scott Nelson). See also 4 Businessmen
Say Saudis Abuse Americans, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1986, § 1, at 21 [hereinafter Saudis Abuse
Americans] (Nelson, along with three other businessmen who worked in Saudi Arabia, held
a news conference demanding a congressional investigation of the atrocities that occur within
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and, as a result, is permanently disabled. 9 Nelson was sequestered for thirty-
nine days, during which time he was never charged with a crime.10 The
Saudi Government claimed that Nelson had been detained because he
violated Saudi Arabian law by falsely asserting that he had graduated from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and by presenting a forged
diploma to verify his claim."
After being released, Nelson and his wife filed a lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida" against the nation
of Saudi Arabia, the King Faisal Hospital" and Royspec." Nelson sought
compensatory and punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (FSIA).'5 The FSIA denies a foreign country the protection
Saudi Arabia).
'Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8, at 22. Additionally, Nelson's wife
was told by a Saudi Government official that her husband could be released if she provided
sexual favors to the Saudi official. Id,
'0 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530. Nelson was released only after Senator Edward Kennedy
and former Representative Larry Smith intervened on his behalf. See generally Nelson, 113
S. CL at 1475.
" Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1475 n.l. Nelson admits that he had not earned a college degree
from M.I.T. Brief For Respondent at 9 (No. 91-522).
12 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1530.
13 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia owns and operates the King Faisal Specialist Hospital
in Riyadh. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1474.
'4 Royspec is a Saudi corporation owned and controlled by the Saudi Arabian
Government, which acts as a purchasing agent for the Hospital within the United States. Id.
at 1474. Previously, Nelson had filed suit against the Hospital Corporation of America to
recover damages for the same injuries, but the claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. Nelson v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., No. 90-5994 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1990), aff'd
meme., 946 F.2d 1546 (11 th Cir. 1991).
" The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441,
1602-1611 (1988), [hereinafter FSIA] grants a foreign country immunity from lawsuits within
the United States unless the cause of action is based upon:
a commercial activity performed in the United States by the foreign
state[;J or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere[;] or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere, and that act causes a direct affect
in the United States.
i. § 1605(a)(2). In addition, a foreign state can waive sovereign immunity by: (1) implicit
or explicit waiver; (2) taking rights in property in violation of international law; (3) being a
party to a dispute concerning rights in property acquired by succession or gift or rights in
immovable property; (4) committing noncommercial torts within the United States; (5)
1993]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
of sovereign immunity where a cause of action is "based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state."16 The District
Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed the claims for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that "Nelson's claims were not based
upon the commercial activities of Saudi Arabia carried on in the United
States.""7  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding
Nelson's detention and torture were "so intertwined with his employment at
the Hospital that they [were] 'based upon' his recruitment and hiring"' in
the United States. 9 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit. Held, the Saudi Government's police actions
constituted sovereign activity and not commercial activity 20 and thus were
immune from the subject-matter jurisdiction of United States courts under the
Foreign Services Immunities Act of 1976.21
II. LEGAL HISTORY
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, granting absolute immunity to a
foreign state for all its actions, has been recognized by the United States
courts since the early 1800's.2 As commercial transactions between the
abrogating an agreement with a private citizen that sufficiently touches the United States; or
by (6) being a party to a suit in admiralty brought to enforce a maritime lien. Id. § 1605.
See FSIA, supra, § 1605(a)-(d) (enumerating the technical requirements for each of the
exceptions).
SId § 1605(aX2). A "commercial activity" qualifies as one exception to the general rule
that a foreign sovereign's actions are otherwise immune from suit in United States courts.
See supra note 15.
17 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1529. The court concluded that "the link between the recruitment
activities and [Saudi Arabia] is not sufficient to establish 'substantial contact' with the United
States." Id at 1530. In addition, "even if the court had determined that [the Hospital] and
Saudi Arabia had carried on commercial activities having substantial contact with the United
States through the indirect recruitment activities, the court would be unable to find a nexus
between those activities and Nelson's complaint." Id.
1s Id at 1535. The court concluded that the recruitment and hiring of Nelson within the
United States constituted a "commercial activity" of the Saudi Government, and that Nelson's
subsequent detention and torture were "based upon" Nelson's recruitment and hiring within
the United States. hId at 1536.
'9 See infra text accompanying note 55.
20 Id.
21 FSIA, supra note 15, § 1605(a)(2).
2' The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). See infra notes
28-30 and accompanying text.
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nations increased, however, the United States began to recognize exceptions
to the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.23 Subsequently, the United
States Congress codified the doctrine of sovereign immunity, including
exceptions to the doctrine,2 in passing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976,25 which barred a foreign state from invoking immunity from
suit in United States courts in specific circumstances.' Recently, litigants
have raised the question of whether a foreign nation's exercise of its police
powers are immune actions in all circumstances."
A. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was first recognized in the United
States courts in the case of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,2s in
which Chief Justice Marshall held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
embodies the principle that a nation is immune from suit in another country's
courts and is supported by the law and practice of nations." The courts of
the United States next developed the "Act of State" doctrine, the theory of
sovereign immunity, which provides absolute immunity from the jurisdiction
of United States courts for any action by a foreign state, commercial or
2 See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, to the Acting
Attorney-General (May 19, 1952) reprinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter
Tate letter].
2 See FSIA, supra note 15 and infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
25 See FSIA, supra note 15 and infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
2 id.
2 See infra note 60.
2 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The plaintiffs, M'Faddon and Greetham, claimed that
they were the sole owners of a ship which was "violently and forcibly" taken by persons
acting under the orders of Napoleon, Emperor of France. lit After the Schooner Exchange
docked in the port of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs attempted to recover the vessel in the United
States courts. The Supreme Court of the United States held that France could not be sued in
a U.S. court because the country's sovereign immunity protected it from legal consequences
for its actions. Harper, the attorney for the appellees, stated "whenever the act is done by a
sovereign in his sovereign character, it becomes a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals, or of
war, according to its importance .... [J]ustice is to be administered with due regard to the
law of nations, and to the rights of other sovereigns." Id. at 122.
2 Id. at 122. See also H.R. REp. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
19931
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Subsequently, in the early 1900's, the United States Supreme Court,
deferring to the political branches of government, relied less on the absolute
theory of sovereign immunity, as incorporated in the "Act of State" doctrine,
and, more on the recommendations and policies of the executive branch.31
The U.S. State Department, in response to the increasing number of
commercial transactions conducted with foreign states,32 formally adopted
a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 19523 whereby foreign
immunity was recognized in cases based on a country's noncommercial or
30 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Underhill, a citizen of the United
States, brought an action against General Hernandez, a Venezuelan revolutionist, for damages
resulting from a refusal to grant a passport. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
holding for Hernandez, stated that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory." Id. at 252. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 443(1) (1987) (courts of the United States
"will generally refrain... from sitting in judgment on other acts of a governmental character
done by a foreign state within its own territory and applicable there"). See Ex Parte Peni,
318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (Act of State doctrine "is founded upon the policy ... that our
national interest will be better served in such cases if the wrongs ... are righted through
diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings").
" H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606. See
Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588 ("the judicial department ... follows the action of the
political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction"
(quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882))); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30,
38 (1945) (jurisdiction allowed where U.S. State Department refused to recognize immunity
from a suit involving a vessel owned but not possessed by a foreign government).
32 See generally H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 6-7, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. The Committee on the Judiciary noted that:
American citizens are increasingly coming into contact with foreign states
and entities owned by foreign states. These interactions arise in a variety
of circumstances, and they call into question whether our citizens will
have access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes....
[The FSIA codifies] the so-called restrictive principle of sovereign
immunity ... [which] was adopted by the Department of State in 1952
and has been followed by the courts and by the executive branch ever
since.
Id. at 6605.33 See Tate Letter, supra note 23 (stating that "it will hereafter be the Department's policy
to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity .... According to the newer or
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with
regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts
(jure gestionis).").
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public acts (jure imperii), but not in cases based on a country's commercial
or private acts (jure gestionis).34  However, foreign countries exerted
diplomatic influence on the State Department35 to avoid the application of
the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity in the U.S. courts, and, as a
result, the American litigant confronted considerable uncertainty in the
applicability of the newer theory.' The American litigant, however, needed
more stability from sovereign immunity decisions than the vacillating
policies of the U.S. State Department could provide.
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Partly in response to this uncertainty," the Congress of the United States
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.38 The Act codified
34 See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704 (1976) (a state engages in
commercial activity under the restrictive theory where it exercises "only those powers that can
also be exercised by private citizens," as distinct from those "powers peculiar to sovereigns").
31 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606,
which notes:
[a] principal purpose of [the FSIA] is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch,
thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity determina-
tions and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are made on
purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.
Id.
3 Id. In applying the restrictive policy, the State Department was in the awkward
position of a political body, swayed by the pressures of foreign political leaders, trying to
apply a strict legal standard to litigation that was already before the courts, and, thus,
interfering with the judicial branch. Id. See also Verlinden B. V., 461 U.S. at 487 (discussing
placement of diplomatic pressure on the U.S. State Department by foreign nations seeking
immunity).
31 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607.
The Committee on the Judiciary noted:
[firom the standpoint of the private litigant, considerable uncertainty
results. A private party who deals with a foreign government entity
cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be
decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign
government's intercession with the Department of State.
Id. at 6607. The purpose of the FSIA was to "provide when and how parties can maintain
a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States and to provide
when a foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity." Id. at 6604.
3' FSIA, supra note 15.
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the principles and the exceptions of the "restrictive" theory of sovereign
immunity.39 Moreover, Congress entrusted sovereign immunity. decisions
exclusively to the courts, thereby discontinuing the State Department's
inconsistent application of the restrictive theory.'
The Act generally grants sovereign immunity to foreign governments4'
but also provides exceptions that prevent a foreign state from invoking
sovereign immunity in every context. If an exception applies, a sovereign's
conduct42 is effectively removed from the protection of the FSIA. The
"commercial activity" exception to sovereign immunity43 has been exten-
sively litigated in the United States courts' because Congress chose to give
9 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607. See
also Scott J. Graves, Note, Jurisdiction-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Using the
"Nexus Test" to Find Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d
1528 (11th Cir. 1991), 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 333, 338 (1992) ("the FSIA [frees] the
government from the diplomatic pressures associated with deciding issues of foreign sovereignimmunity, and [assures] that such decisions are based on purely legal grounds"); Vencedora
Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195, 198
(5th Cir. 1984) (FSIA provides uniform procedure establishing subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign sovereign entities).
o H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. See
Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588-89 (the practice of presenting a claim to the Department of
State "is founded on the policy ... that our national interest will be better served in such
cases if the wrongs'... are righted through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the
compulsions of judicial proceedings"). See also Tate letter, supra note 23.
4' 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988) (mandating that "a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections
1605 to 1607").
42 Id. § 1605 (before listing the exceptions to sovereign immunity, § 1605 provides that
"[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
or of the States in any case [in which an exception applies]"). See also FSIA, supra note 15.
4' 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2) (1988). The commercial activity exception includes: (1) a
commercial activity-performed in the United States by the foreign state; (2) an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign states elsewhere;
or (3) an act outside the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. Id
44 See Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992). Bond holders
brought a breach of contract action against Argentina for the unilateral extension of the time
for payment on the bonds issued as a part of a currency stabilization plan. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the U.S. courts had jurisdiction under the commercial
activity exception to the FSIA. Id at 2169. See also Argentine Republic v. Amenda Hess
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). Amenda Hess Corp., a Liberian corporation, brought
suit against Argentina when their crude oil tanker was attacked and severely damaged by an
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the courts considerable latitude in defining "commercial activity."45
Although the courts were given considerable latitude,' Congress
narrowed the courts' discretion by defining such an activity as a "commercial
activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the
United States."4 A commercial activity may be "either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act," the
commercial character of which "shall be determined by reference to its
nature,... rather than.., its purpose.""
In the landmark cases of Velidor v. LIPG Benghazi 9 and Sugarman v.
Argentine military aircraft during the Falkland war. The Supreme Court of the United States
held that none of the enumerated exceptions to the FSIA applied and, thus, that the court had
no jurisdiction. Id. at 443. Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. at 480.
Nigeria and Verlinden B. V., a Dutch corporation, entered into a contract providing for the
purchase by Nigeria of 240,000 metric tons of cement. Verlinden B. V. alleged that Nigeria
had breached the contract and brought suit in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. The Supreme Court of the United States, after holding that jurisdiction under the
exceptions to the FSIA is constitutional, remanded the case to determine whether the cause
of action satisfies one of the exceptions to the FSIA. Id. at 497-98. See also KENNETH C.
RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM 93 (1990)
("the FSIA's most significant and most litigated immunity exception [is] the commercial-
activity exception").
4' H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
Congress stated that "courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a
'commercial activity' for purposes of this bill. It has seemed unwise to attempt an
excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were practicable." Id See also
Gregory Jay, Recent Development, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 539, 547 (1991).
46 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1988).
"Id § 1603(d). In Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 359-60 (2d Cir. 1964), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
"rejected the suggestion that it is the nature of an activity-e.g., entering into a purchase
contract-and not its purpose-e.g., providing food for the armed forces-that determines
whether an activity is commercial. Congress ... did not adopt the view of the Court of
Appeals." See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 453 note 2, at 403 (1986).
An activity by a foreign country "is deemed commercial, even if carried out by a state or state
instrumentality, if it is concerned with production, sale, or purchase of goods .... The fact
that the goods, property, money, or services may be used for a public or governmental
purpose does not alter the commercial character of the activity." Id. § 453 cmt. b, at 402.
"9 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 929 (1982). In this case, several
Yugoslavian seamen demanded payment for their services from the Algerian government
under the United States Seaman's Wage Act while the ship was docked in New Jersey. The
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey ordered the ship seized pending
1993]
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Aeromexico, ° the Third Circuit Court of Appeals devised a bifurcated
approach to determine whether a foreign state's acts fall within the.
commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.s"
First, the nature, and not of the purpose, of the act must be ascertained to
determine whether the act is "commercial."5' 2 Therefore, if the foreign
government acts not as a regulator of a market but as a private player, the
foreign sovereign's actions are "commercial" within the meaning of the
FSIA.53
Next, the court determines whether a sufficient "nexus" exists between the
foreign state's act and the commercial activity carried on within the United
States, so that the act can be deemed "based on" the commercial activity as
resolution of the case, but the court lifted the order after discovering that the ship was owned
by Algeria. The seamen, however, asserted that the court had personal jurisdiction over the
agency of the Algerian government which owned the ship. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the sailing of the ship into the United States port and
the discharging and receiving of cargo in the United States constituted commercial activity
under the FSIA. In addition, the court held that the acts of the ship and the crew satisfied
the jurisdictional nexus requirement placing the entire case within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts, thus allowing the seamen to recover under the Seaman's Wage Act. Id. at 822.
'o 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980). A passenger sued the national airline of Mexico for
wrongs allegedly suffered by him in a Mexico airport as he was awaiting a delayed flight to
New York City. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
commercial flights into the United States constitute commercial activity under the FSIA and
that the flight into New York City satisfied the jurisdictional nexus requirement absolving
Mexico of sovereign immunity in the case. Id. at 275.
' Velidor, 653 F.2d at 812; Sugarman, 626 F.2d at 272. See also Vencedora Oceanica
Navigacion v. Compagie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984),
in which the owner of a vessel seized by the Algerian government and, subsequently wrecked
in a storm, brought an-action against the Algerian government alleging that it had tortiously
deprived the owner of his vessel. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
adopted the Third Circuit's bifurcated approach, but it held that the acts of the Algerian
government did not satisfy the jurisdictional nexus requirement Id. at 202, 204. The United
States Supreme Court applied the bifurcated approach in SaudiArabia v. Nelson. Nelson, 113
S. Ct. at 1477.
52 Velidor, 653 F.2d at 817. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1988). "The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." ld.
" Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2166; See Alfred Dunhill of London Inc., 425 U.S. at 704 (a
foreign state engaging in commercial activities "do[es] not exercise powers peculiar to
sovereigns[, rather it] exercise[s] only those powers that can also be exercised by private
citizens").
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required by section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA.M Thus, subject-matter jurisdic-
tion exists if there is a sufficient "nexus" between the acts giving rise to
liability and the commercial activity carried on by the foreign state within
the United States.55 In Nelson,56 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
used the bifurcated approach to determine that Saudi Arabia was not entitled
to invoke sovereign immunity under the FSIA because the commercial
activity of recruiting and hiring Nelson within the United States was
indistinguishably intertwined with Nelson's subsequent detainment and
torture by Saudi Government officials." The Supreme Court of the United
States disagreed, holding that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals erred
because the Saudi Government's "police powers" did not constitute a
"commercial activity."'
C. Police Powers
Traditionally, under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,59 a
foreign state's exercise of its police power has been understood as being
particularly sovereign in nature.' The internal police powers of a foreign
state are precisely the public acts to which the FSIA grants sovereign
See Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion, 730 F.2d at 200-02.
SLd. at 202. See also American West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793,
796 (9th Cir. 1989) (subject-matter jurisdiction exists if there is "a nexus between the
defendant's commercial activity in the United States and the plaintiff's grievance"); De
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th Cir. 1985) (section
1605(a)(2) requires a "jurisdictional nexus with the United States"); Velidor, 653 F.2d at 820
(finding it "essential that there be a nexus between the plaintiffs' grievance and the
sovereign's commercial activity").
Nelson, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
7 Id. at 1535.
" Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1480 (1993). Justice Souter stated, "[the Saudi Government's
wrongful arrest, imprisonment, and torture of Nelson) could not qualify as commercial under
the restrictive theory .... A foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has long been
understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature."
9 See, supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
6 See Herbage v. Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 67 (D.C.C. 1990), affd, 946 F.2d 1564 (D.C.
Cir. 1991); Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980);
Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisara General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354,
360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (immunity for "internal administrative
acts").
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immunity." In addition, two relatively recent cases, Tucker v. Whitaker
Travel, Ltd.62 and Herbage v. Meese,' confirm the Supreme Court's
determination that U.S. courts should not adjudicate a foreign country's
administrative and law enforcement acts." However, these two cases
involve action by foreign states that did not take place in a commercial
context and that could not be considered purely sovereign.' Moreover, the
executive branch asserted in Filartiga v. Pena-irala' that "official torture
is both clearly defined and universally condemned... [tiherefore, private
enforcement is entirely appropriate."67
6' H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 29, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. See
also Statement of Interest of the United States in Support of Rehearing and Suggestion for
Rehearing en Banc, Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (No. 89-5981) at 2-3
(judgement of one nation's police activities on its own territory by the courts of another state
is a matter of international sensitivity).
'2 620 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
986 (1986). Plaintiffs, who were injured in a fall from a horse in the Bahamas, filed suit
against the Bahamian government for failing to investigate the accident and for failing to
regulate horseback riding. The District Court held that the lack of action on the part of the
Bahamian government was "peculiarly governmental" and not subject "to scrutiny in the
United States courts." Id. at 584.
63 747 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1990). A British citizen who was convicted of mail fraud,
after being extradited to the United States, claimed that British officials had illegally assisted
in his extradition. The District Court held that the acts constituted "official governmental
functions" which were immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts. ld at 67.
6' See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
6 See Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the Department of State, May 1952 to Jan. 1977,
1977 DIGEsT App., at 1062 (describing a case that, like Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, involves a
close intermixing of a foreign state's "sovereign" and "commercial" powers). The incident
involved an agency of the Jamaican government conspiring to have Jamaican nationals
working in the United States falsely arrested, imprisoned, and blacklisted, and to deprive them
of wages and other employee rights. The State Department declined to recognize immunity
and instead claimed that private parties acting in an employment context could do exactly
what the Jamaican governmental agency had done. Id
'6 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Paraguayan citizens, while visiting
the United States, brought suit against a Paraguayan national for allegedly causing the death
of their son by the use of torture. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that violations
of universally accepted norms of international law of human rights allows for the United
States courts to assert jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute. Id. at 878, 890.
67 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1990) (No. 79-6090); reprinted in 19 ILM 585, 605 (1980). See also
Symposium, International Hwnan Rights in American Courts; the Case of Nelson v. Saudi
Arabia, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 324, 327 (1992) [hereinafter Human Rights Symposium] (quoting
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Every state has the duty to respect and observe "human rights and
fundamental freedoms in accordance with the [United Nations] Charter."8
In addition, the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) grants to the United
States jurisdiction over individuals involved in the torture of United States
citizens or aliens under the color of law of a foreign country.' However,
neither the U.N. Charter nor the TVPA allow for redress in cases in which
a country's businessmen use their government's police powers as a coercive
tool to control the otherwise lawful conduct of foreign nationals.7° Despite
the fact that the tortured victims of the Saudi business community lack a
feasible legal remedy, the Supreme Court of the United States in Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson7 refused to extend the commercial activity exception to
the FSIA to encompass the Saudi Government's use of its police powers in
a commercial setting.72
III. ANALYSIS
The United States courts have jurisdiction in cases where the cause of
action is "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States
Jordan J. Paust, Professor of Law at the University of Houston and Chair of the Association
of American Law Schools' Section on International Law, who remarked that "[flar from being
'pure' or even 'core' sovereign activities, such acts of torture are so tainted with illegality as
to change their very nature or status."). Id.
6 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56; 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (Nov. 4, 1970). The members of the United Nations pledged to
have "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id.
9 The Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, H.R. 2092, at §§ 2(a)(l)-2(b), passed Nov.
25, 1991, 137 CONG. REc. H11244-Hl1245 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992); and signed by the
President on Mar. 12, 1992. PuB. L. No. 102-256. The Act provides that:
[a]n individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law,
of any foreign nation-(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to that individual ... [however a] court
shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not
exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.
Id. See also infra note 117.
o Id § 2(a) (excluding foreign states by limiting jurisdiction to individual defendants).
71 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
2 Id. at 1479-80.
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by the foreign state." 3 As articulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,74 in order to constitute a commercial exception
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, the court must first
consider whether the act complained of was a "commercial activity."75 If
the first part of the test is satisfied, the court must then determine if the
commercial activity has a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with the United
States to have been carried on in the United States.76 If the facts satisfy the
bifurcated approach, then the United States courts have jurisdiction over the
case, and the foreign country is barred from invoking sovereign immunity as
an absolute defense.
A. Commercial Activity
According to the FSIA, a commercial activity may be "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act,"
the commercial character of which is determined by reference to its "nature,"
rather than its "purpose."'77 According to the majority opinion in Nelson,78
despite the suggestion that the Saudi Arabian government 9 uses its "police
powers" to illegally resolve commercial disputes, the police powers allegedly
abused were those of police or penal officers which are acts inherently
sovereign in nature.' The majority concluded that the purpose of the acts
is irrelevant. The nature of "police powers" are sovereign since the
"[e]xercise of the powers of police and penal officers is not the sort of action
by which private parties can engage in commerce.""1  Thus, the actions
were not based upon "commercial activity" within the meaning of the
7 FSIA, supra note 15, § 1605(a)(2) (the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976).
74Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477.
75 See Velidor v. Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 819 (3d Cir. 1981); Sugarman v. Aeromexico,
Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 1980).
76 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477.
7' FSIA, supra note 15, § 1603(d).
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
7The majority held that Saudi Arabia, the Hospital, and Royspec all qualify as "foreign
states" within the meaning of §§ 1603(a) and (b), since the definition of "foreign state"
includes "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." Id. at 1477.
go Id. at 1479.
SId at 1480.
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FSIA. 2 The majority did not consider whether the detainment and torture
of American citizens is a routine business practice of the Saudi Government
as an agent and coercive tool of the Saudi businessmen, and, thus, qualifies
as "commercial activity" under the FSIA. 3
In their concurring opinion, however, Justices White and Blackmun
acknowledged that torture and other retaliatory action, although not
archetypical commercial acts, are "the manner in which private parties at
times do engage in commerce."" Justice White cited several cases in
which private employers, from various countries, have retaliated against
employees by enlisting the help of police officers, public authorities, and
private security personnel to falsely arrest the employees."3 As Justice
White stated, had the Hospital retaliated against Nelson by hiring "thugs" to
do the job, the majority, no longer able to describe this conduct as "police
power," would consent to calling it "commercial."' '  Moreover, Justice
White declared that the state-owned Hospital was engaged in ordinary
commercial business, and thus, the Saudi Government, through the Hospital,
exercised those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens.8 7
Although the Saudi police were used to detain and torture Scott Nelson,
they acted at the dictate and as an agency of the Hospital. 8 Consequently,
the Supreme Court should not have differentiated between the Hospital's
commercial activity of recruiting and hiring Nelson within the United States
and the "police powers" of the Saudi Government; the two were inextricably
intertwined. In an attempt to demonstrate that the Saudi Arabian government
8 Id. at 1481.
13 Justice Souter acknowledged that one amicus brief went "so far as to suggest that the
Saudi Government 'often uses detention and torture to resolve commercial disputes.' "
However, he claimed that regardless of the purpose of the actions, the "police powers" of a
foreign country are immune. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1480.
" id. at 1481 (White, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 1482. See, e.g., Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies Garment Cutters' Union, 605
F.2d 1228, 1233, 1247-48 (2d Cir. 1979) (labor union manager used police officers to falsely
arrest three members of local union), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress &.Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (police officers falsely arrested woman "in the company
of Negroes" while in public place); Albright v. Longview Police Dept., 884 F.2d 835, 841-42
(5th Cir. 1989) (hospital employee falsely arrested by security guard for distributing leaflets).
s Id. at 1482.
Id. at 1484. See also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 704
(1976).
g8 See Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8; Saudis Abuse Americans,
supra note 8, at 21.
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routinely engages in the reprehensible species of "business activity" at the
caprice of Saudi businessmen, Nelson and three other businessmen, who had
worked in Saudi Arabia, held a news conference on November 20, 1986.89
The four businessmen recounted experiences when they had been imprisoned,
beaten, interrogated, and tortured by Saudi Arabian Government officials in
retaliation for business decisions to which the Saudis objected. 9°
In response to these allegations, the House Foreign Affairs Committee
conducted a hearing about the routine "business practices" of the Saudi
Government.91 During the hearing, Sam Bamieh, the Chairman of the
Board of Industrial Development Group, Inc., an American company
routinely conducting business in Saudi Arabia, revealed that he had been
detained, threatened, interrogated, and harassed by officials of the Saudi
Government for four and one-half months because of a business dispute that
arose in California with a Saudi businessman, 92 who was an employee and
close friend of King Fahd. 93 Nelson also testified before the Subcommittee,
" Saudis Abuse Americans, supra note 8, at 21. The men recounted purported incidents
of imprisonment, beatings, interrogation, and torture at the hands of the Saudi officials and
claimed that hundreds of other Americans had undergone similar experiences. Each of the
men maintains that he was seized in retaliation for business decisions to which the Saudis
objected. Id Sam J. Bamieh, one of the businessmen, claimed that his imprisonment was
not an isolated incident, and that "it took place right under the nose of the King of Saudi
Arabia." Id See also Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8.
9 Saudis Abuse Americans, supra note 8, at 21. See also Joseph O'Leary, Smith's Bill
Would Allow Torture Victims to Sue Foreign Gov'ts, STATES NEWS SERVICE, May 15, 1991.
In December of 1979, Luben Ivanoff was held captive by his employers for two weeks
because he had asked to be paid. Id In addition, a British businessman, who refused to pay
a Saudi business partner illegal "commissions," was imprisoned for two and one-half years
where he suffered repeated beatings, sexual assaults, near-starvation, and a broken back at the
hands of the Saudi Government officials. Lippman, supra note 1, at A8.
91 Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8, at 1.
92 Id at 16-20 (prepared statement of Sam Joseph Bamieh, Chairman of the Board,
Industrial Development Group, Inc.).
9 After King Khalid ibn-Abdul Aziz died on June 12, 1982, the present King of Saudi
Arabia, sixty-two-year-old Crown Prince Fahd ibn-Abdul Aziz, succeeded to the throne. For
a survey of the Saudi Arabian dynasty see GENE LINDSEY, SAuDI ARABIA 103-44 (1991).
The Saudi businessman, Mohammed Imran, was the former head of the King's Private Office.
He was served with the lawsuit while Bamieh was visiting within Saudi Arabia, and, two days
latter, Bamieh was warned not to leave the country. In addition, Bamieh was urged to settle
the lawsuit before it was "too late." Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8,
at 14. Habib Shaheen, a spokesman for the embassy, declined to respond to the charges,
saying "I think the whole thing is not worth a comment." Saudis Abuse Americans, supra
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recounting his torture at the hands of Saudi officials in response to his
refusal to ignore the employment duties of his position at the King Faisal
Hospital."
Larry Garber, Director of the International Human Rights Law Group,
testified that the routine torture of American businesspersons occurs because
of "the manipulation of the justice system by well-connected Saudi
businessmen and foreign employers in Saudi Arabia."'9 The businessmen
are detained and tortured pending the resolution of business-related disputes
and are forced to settle the disputes on disadvantageous terms." In
addition, Garber discussed the use by Saudi businessmen of the Saudi
Government as a tool to coerce American citizens into involuntary "employ-
ment."' Moreover, the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights
Committee reported that summary arrest and detention of foreign workers in
Saudi Arabia is commonplace.98 One renowned member of the Internation-
al Board of Directors of the Minority Rights Group noted that there was no
note 8, at 21.
9' Id. at 21-23. In addition, three other people testified about the torture and kidnappings
of loved ones that occurred because of the Saudi Government's barbaric policies and conduct.
Id. at 30-76. James Edward Smzkovski, one of the three who testified, was subjected to
torture with an electric prod, had six toenails mutilated, and was beaten with a bamboo stick
on the bottom of his feet. Id. at 31. Another witness testified about how a dowel was
secured to the back of his leg with a small rope:
The two guards grabbed [him] and forced [him] to bend at the knee and
do deep knee bends... . [He] could hear the cracking noise as [his] knees
bent over the dowel and the joints started to separate..... To assist [him]
in repeating the procedure, the guards inserted a rod approximately four
foot long between [his] legs, and they would jostle the rod down and they
would do this until [he] could do it no more.
ld. at 63. Nelson was tortured using the identical barbaric methods. Mauro, supra note 8,
at 8A.
" Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8, at 77 (statement of Larry Garber,
Director, International Human Rights Law Group).
96 id.
9' Id. Subsequently, the United States House of Representatives held a number of
hearings on the practices of the Saudi Arabian government as a coercive tool of Saudi
businessmen. See Amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-149 (1992); Problems Confronting Businesspersons, supra note 8.
"Mauro, supra note 8, at 8A. The egregious behavior occurs despite the fact that the
Saudi system is based on Islamic Law and thus "prohibits the mistreatment in any way, shape,
or form of individuals in custody." Lippman, supra note 1, at A8.
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reasonable explanation why engaging in commercial activity, which is
perfectly lawful behavior, should disentitle a state of sovereign immunity,
whereas engaging in the most egregiously shocking violations of human
rights, not lawful under the law of nations, should entitle a state to sovereign
immunity."
The U.S. State Department has conceded that businessmen are periodically
detained within Saudi Arabia pending resolution of business disputes with
Saudi associates." Moreover, in Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialists
Republics,"° the District Court for the District of Columbia held that
because Congress intended to incorporate principles of international law into
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the statute does not extend immunity
to clear violations of universally recognized principles of internationallaw. 02
Given the quantity and credibility of the testimony and documentation
about the routine use of the Saudi Government's "police power" to resolve
business disputes, 0 3 the Supreme Court should have recognized that the
Saudi Government's detainment and torture, as vicarious acts of the Hospital
while engaging in commercial activity, was "commercial activity" within the
meaning of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976."°4 The Saudi
Government's torture of Scott Nelson and the Hospital's commercial activity
within the United States were indistinguishably intertwined since the Hospital
used the Saudi Arabian "police power" as a coercive business tool.
B. Jurisdictional Nexus
In addition to the detainment and torture of Nelson constituting a
"commercial activity" under the FSIA,'O° the "commercial activity" carried
on by Saudi Arabia must have had "substantial contact" with the United
" Human Rights Symposium, supra note 67, at 335 (comments by Jennie Hatfield-Lyon,
Adjunct Professor of the Faculty of Law of Queens University in Ontario, Canada).
1oo Saudis Abuse Americans, supra note 8, at 21.
ION Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
,o2 Id. at 254-56. In another section, the court held that "a sovereign may implicitly waive
its immunity for such violations when it ratifies a human rights agreement." Id. at 256.
loG See supra note 83.
o, FSIA, supra note 15, § 1605(a)(2).
1o5 Id.
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States to fall under the "commercial activity" exception to the FSIA.'0
According to the FSIA, "substantial contacts" requires a sufficient jurisdic-
tional "nexus" between the "commercial activity" and the United States to
have been "carried on in the United States."'
7
The Nelson majority held that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction since the acts
of the Saudi Government were not based on the commercial activities of the
Hospital in recruiting and hiring Scott Nelson within the United States. In
so holding, the Court left undecided whether the commercial activity had
"substantial contacts" with the United States." However, both Justice
Stevens, in dissent,"°' and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals," °
opined that the activities within the United States of Saudi Arabia, the
Hospital, and Royspec satisfied the required jurisdictional nexus to qualify
as a "substantial contact.""' Moreover, in Meadows v. Dominican Repub-
lic,"' the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the government
of the Dominican Republic had sufficient contacts with the United States
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in similar business agreements
as those in Nelson."' Similarly, when Saudi Arabia, the Hospital, and
Royspec advertised for the position in a magazine circulated within the
106 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) and (b) include "an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state" under the definition of a "foreign state." Id.
'o7 See Velidor, 653 F.2d at 812; Sugarman, 626 F.2d at 272.
106 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1477 ("[b]ecause we conclude that the suit is not based upon any
commercial activity by petitioners, we need not reach the issue of substantial contact with the
United States").
'0 Id. at 1487-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"
0 Nelson, 923 F.2d at 1528 (1 th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
. Id. at 1533. "It is clear from the record that the recruitment and hiring of Nelson, in
the United States, was part of a process having 'substantial contact with the United States.'"
Id
"' Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976
(1987).
11 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the United States courts had jurisdiction
in a case where the Dominican Government negotiated for and obtained services of American
businessmen through the use of the United States mail and telephone systems. The
Dominican Government agreed to pay in United States dollars at Plaintiff's chosen banks,
repeatedly availed themselves of the privileges of American laws by seeking recourse in the
courts of the United States, and did not present any reason why litigating in the United States
would be a hardship for them. In addition, the United States had a strong interest in
furnishing a forum to the citizens, whose effort to obtain relief in the Dominican courts were
effectively blocked. Id. at 523.
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United States," 4 recruited Scott Nelson to work at the Hospital, signed an
employment contract with Nelson within the United States, and subsequently
employed Nelson, Saudi Arabia purposely availed itself of the laws of the
United States and the privileges of conducting activities within the country.
Thus, by invoking the benefits and protections of its laws, the defendants
could have reasonably expected to be haled into court in the United
States."' In addition, Saudi Arabia did not present any reason why
litigating in the United States would be a hardship. 16 The United States,
furthermore, had a strong interest in furnishing a legal forum to Scott
Nelson, who had no realistic hope for redress in the courts of Saudi
Arabia."
7
C. Policy Considerations
Scholars argue that the extension of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to encompass a foreign country's "police powers" would lead to retaliatory
or reciprocal extension of foreign jurisdictions to encompass the actions of
14 See supra note 2. In 1983, the magazine had a weekly circulation of 106,000 copies.
Id.
"5 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (holding that if a defendant has engaged in significant
activities within a state or has created continuing obligations between himself and residents
of the forum, he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there,
and because his business activities are shielded by the benefits and protections of the forum's
laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation
in that forum as well); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[i]t is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the [country], thus invoking the benefits and protections of [its]
laws"); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S, 220, 222 (1957) (to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, "due process requires only that... [the defendant]
have certain minimum contacts with [the country] such that [it] does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice' "). See also International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) ("[t]here have been instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a [country] were thought so substantial and of such a nature as
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities").
116 See supra note 113.
117 Nelson laughed at the suggestion of a realistic hope for legal redress in the Saudi
Arabian tribunals because he unsuccessfully attempted to hire a Saudi lawyer. Mauro, supra
note 8, at 8A. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (stating that a "[country] has a 'manifest
interest' in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by
[out-of-country] actors").
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American law enforcement agencies."' However, foreign states are free
to expand their jurisdictional boundaries regardless of whether the United
States chooses to do so. In addition, the courts of the United States could
choose to expand the jurisdictional boundaries of the FSIA to encompass
only flagrant violations of human rights as defined by international law,"9
thus restricting the tendency of other foreign states to abuse their judicial
systems.'2 Moreover, if the state or federal governments of the United
States ever engaged in the sort of egregious behavior that routinely
characterizes Saudi Government conduct, the injured parties, unlike Scott
Nelson, would have an adequate legal remedy in U.S. courts. 2'
In addition, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may diminish the
attractiveness of Americans to foreign employers because foreign employers
may not want to risk becoming subject to litigation in U.S. courts.' 2
However, the courts of the United States or the U.S. Congress could allow
United States citizens the freedom to contract around the commercial
exception to the FSIA if, unlike Nelson,2 3 they are given adequate warning
and they voluntarily and knowingly agree to relinquish their rights.
Consequently, because the Saudi Government officials were acting as the
coercive agents and at the dictate of the King Faisal Hospital when they
imprisoned and tortured Nelson, the Supreme Court should have held that the
acts were another form of "commercial" conduct. When this genre of
conduct is jurisdictionally linked with the United States, as it was when the
Hospital recruited and hired Nelson from within the United States, the
conduct falls within the "commercial activity" exception to the Foreign
,1 See Statement of Interest of the United States in Support of Rehearing and Suggestion
for Rehearing en Banc at 2-3, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (1991), rev'd, 113 S.
Ct. 1471 (No. 89-5981).
19 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
'2 See generally Human Rights Symposium, supra note 67, at 327 (statement by Jordan
J. Paust, Professor of Law at the University of Houston and Chair of the Association of
American Law Schools' Section on International Law).
121 See supra note 117.
'22 Sidney A. Patchett, Note, Nelson v. Saudi Arabia: An Unrestricted Reading of the
Restrictive Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign Immunity, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 541,
565-66 (1991-92).
123 Nelson, 113 S. Ct. at 1476 (the Nelsons claimed that the Hospital had negligently
failed to warn them of otherwise undisclosed dangers of the employment, namely, that if Scott
Nelson attempted to report safety hazards, the Hospital would likely retaliate against him and
the Saudi Government might detain and physically abuse him without legal cause).
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Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.'24
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should have declined to extend sovereign immunity
to Saudi Arabia under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act where ample
testimony and documentary evidence in the record proved that Saudi
businessmen routinely use the Saudi Arabian Government as a tool to coerce
American businessmen into submitting to their mandates. The torture of
foreign businesspersons is a routine commercial practice of the Saudi
Arabian Government, and therefore, the Supreme Court should have regarded
the torture of Scott Nelson as a "commercial activity" under the FSIA that
was indistinguishably intertwined with the Hospital's recruitment and hiring
of Nelson from within the United States. In addition, the recruiting and
hiring of Nelson from within the United States satisfied the jurisdictional
"nexus" requirement of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Moreover,
the policy concerns militate in favor of allowing for legal redress in the
United States courts. The practices of the Saudi Government, no matter how
atypical, fall within the second exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976, and the Supreme Court should have allowed Scott Nelson
to seek legal reparations for his permanent injuries within the United States
justice system.
Keith D. Bodoh
124 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18 (1965):
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an
effect within its territory, if... the effect within its territory is substantial
[and] it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory.
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